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INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty has been an increasingly central theme in 
discussions of competition law in Europe since the beginning of 
“modernization” efforts in the 1990s.1 This may seem 
paradoxical, because the modernization programs—both 
institutional and substantive—were intended to reduce the 
range of variation in competition law rules and thereby increase 
uniformity and predictability of results throughout the 
expanding European Union, and they were justified by claims 
that they would achieve these benefits. Does the chorus of 
concerns about the lack of predictability in European 
competition law mean that the modernization processes were 
misguided or that they have failed? In my view, the answer is 
“no.” They have, however, transformed and relocated 
uncertainty in ways that are seldom adequately recognized and 
                                                                                                                                  
1. See, e.g., Imelda Maher & Oana Stefan, Competition Law in Europe: The Challenge 
of a Network Constitution, in THE REGULATORY STATE: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
178, 189 (Dawn Oliver et al. eds., 2010). 
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rarely addressed. Insufficient recognition of these 
transformations and their implications has wide-ranging and 
potentially serious implications for competition law in Europe 
and even for global competition law development.2 How then 
are we to reconcile the aims of modernization with its 
consequences? 
A basic theme of this Article is that although the two forms 
of modernization have in some ways reduced uncertainty in EU 
competition law, they have also generated new forms of 
uncertainty that have sometimes concealed and at other times 
transformed it. The Article analyzes the impacts of 
“modernization” on competition law decision-making in the 
European Union and thus on the substance of the law itself. It 
identifies the areas and forms of uncertainty that have resulted 
from these modernizations. While some commentators have 
noted elements of the relationship between modernization and 
uncertainty,3 that relationship may be more fundamental to 
understanding European competition law than is generally 
recognized. 
The Article also examines the conceptual tools typically 
used in thinking about European competition law and 
demonstrates how these can be inadequate for the legal 
situation in the wake of modernization. Often they no longer 
provide adequate analysis of the complex processes of decision-
making in Europe today. I then go on to suggest ways in which 
these tools can themselves be “modernized” to account for these 
changing complexities. In order to deal effectively with 
European competition law, it is necessary to use a perspective 
that is specifically designed to identify the factors that shape 
competition law decisions.    
The Article thus has two central objectives. One is to 
explore the transformations of uncertainty in European 
competition law that impede recognition of the “modernized” 
contours of competition law and to identify some of their 
                                                                                                                                  
2. See generally DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND 
GLOBALIZATION 187–204 (2010). 
3. See, e.g., Damien M.B. Gerard, The Effects-Based Approach Under Article 101 TEFU 
and its Paradoxes: Modernisation at War with Itself?, in TEN YEARS OF EFFECTS-BASED 
APPROACH IN EU COMPETITION LAW: STATE OF PLAY AND PERSPECTIVES 18, 18 (Jaques 
Bourgeois & Denis Waelbroeck eds., 2012). 
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potential consequences. A second objective is to suggest some 
modified tools that can be of value in more effectively and 
precisely analyzing and understanding competition law in 
Europe. 
I. THE SEARCH FOR PREDICTABILITY IN EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION LAW 
Access to the content of laws is a fundamental concern of 
law, at least in developed legal systems. This “knowability” of law 
is a central factor in its roles, its functions, and its value to those 
involved with it or affected by it. Only to the extent that law 
provides knowable content can it serve most of the social 
purposes that it purports to serve. This means that it can serve 
these objectives only where authority-based decisions about the 
content of the law can be predicted with reasonable confidence. 
In the context of the European Union, the role of predictability 
(often referred to as “legal certainty”) takes on additional 
functions and dimensions. Law is the basic tool for the 
European integration process, and thus the predictability and 
stability of its content are central to that process and to the 
confidence of EU stakeholders and citizens in the operation of 
EU institutions and governance structures. Moreover, EU 
citizens demand that law be knowable and reasonably 
predictable, so that they can assess their own rights and 
obligations within the European Union as well as the obligations 
of others. This has been true since the founding of the 
European integration institutions, but it has become a 
particularly sensitive issue in recent years, as membership in the 
European Union has dramatically expanded and EU-level 
regulation has penetrated economic and social domains 
previously reserved for national institutions. Recent 
controversies about the future of European integration 
exacerbate concerns about the knowability and predictability of 
EU laws.4 
Predictability takes on a particularly salient role in 
competition law. This area of European law has long played a 
                                                                                                                                  
4. See, e.g., Paul Taylor, Europe’s Zigzag Course Toward Integration, REUTERS (Dec. 
24, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/25/business/international/
europes-zigzag-course-toward-integration.html. 
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central role in the process of European integration, not least 
because of the centrality of economic development and the role 
of the market in that process.5 In addition, competition law has 
often been a center of attention in the process of European 
integration, not least because it directly affects powerful 
economic and sometimes also political interests. It is often a 
front-page issue and an immediate concern for business and 
economic decision-makers as well as the general public. These 
factors further enhance the value of the capacity to “know” the 
content of competition law and thus be in a position to predict 
competition law decisions.  
These concerns have played an important role in efforts to 
“modernize” European competition law, which have focused on 
the need to reduce the range of variation of norms of economic 
conduct within the European Union. I distinguish here between 
two forms of modernization.6 One is what I call “institutional 
modernization” as represented by the “modernization package” 
implemented in 2004.7 This set of reforms included institutional 
and procedural changes aimed at greater efficiency and 
certainty in European competition law. The second form of 
modernization seeks to reduce variations in substantive norms 
by using economics to standardize the basis for competition law 
decisions. I use the term “substantive modernization” to refer to 
this project. It is commonly referred to as a process of 
introducing a “more economic approach” (“MEA”) into 
European competition law.8 The relationship between these two 
related processes is central to issues of predictability and 
uncertainty. The Article first looks at these two forms of 
                                                                                                                                  
5. See generally DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY 
EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 334–46 (1998). 
6. I examine these two forms of modernization and their interrelationships in 
David J. Gerber, Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law, 31 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1235 (2007). 
7. Council Regulation 1/2003/EC on the implementation of the Rules on 
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L 1/1. 
8. For discussion, see for example Lars-Hendrik Röller, Economic Analysis and 
Competition Policy Enforcement in Europe, in MODELLING EUROPEAN MERGERS: THEORY, 
COMPETITION POLICY AND CASE STUDIES 13 (Peter A.G. van Bergeijk & Erik 
Kloosterhuis eds., 2005); Arndt Christiansen, The “More Economic Approach” in EU Merger 
Control—A Critical Assessment (Deutsche Bank Working Paper Series, Research Notes 21, 
2005), available at http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/
PROD0000000000196093/The+%22more+economic+approach%22+in+EU+merger+
control+-+A+critical+assessment.PDF. 
1426 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1421 
modernization separately and then reviews some of the 
relationships that are particularly relevant for the 
transformations of uncertainty. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION AND THE CLOUDED 
ROLES OF INSTITUTIONS 
Institutional modernization and its consequences have 
played a central role in thinking about EU competition law since 
the mid-1990s. Initial plans began evolving in the competition 
directorate of the EU Commission (the “Commission”) in the 
mid-1990s. As the plans for institutional change took shape 
around 2000, it became an important issue at the Member State 
level as well. Enactment of the reforms required formal changes 
that had to be approved by the Member States, and thus the 
process was discussed over a period of years with representatives 
of these governments as well as both European and US 
competition experts. The “modernization package” was enacted 
in 2003, and since then it has been at center stage for all 
involved with competition law in Europe. It has been the subject 
of volumes of commentary, and its implications continue to be a 
major focus of analysis, and a major reference point for 
understanding the competition law situation in Europe today. 
This institutional modernization process centered on two 
objectives—efficiency and uniformity. Both were seen as 
necessary to respond to the increasing size and membership of 
the European Union. Membership increased to fifteen in 1995, 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed very likely to lead 
to further increases. Commission leaders recognized that 
expansion made the existing competition law procedures 
increasingly cumbersome and inefficient. They also realized that 
the globalization wave unleashed in the 1990s together with US 
economic dynamism during that period created new economic 
challenges that called for a more efficient institutional 
mechanism. Among the key changes here was elimination of 
notification requirements for potentially anticompetitive 
agreements as well as elimination of the Commission’s 
monopoly on granting exemptions to the prohibition on 
agreements restricting competition. 
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A. Institutional Modernization, Predictability, and the Search for a 
Single Voice 
A second major objective of these institutional reforms was 
to create greater uniformity and predictability in the rules of 
competition law in Europe by requiring that EU competition law 
be applied to most conduct that might be considered 
anticompetitive.9 Prior to 2004 there was no single voice for 
competition law in Europe.10 The EU applied its rules according 
to its understanding of its jurisdictional prerogatives, and each 
Member State applied its own competition laws on the basis of 
its own conceptions of its jurisdictional reach. European Union 
competition law had priority in some situations over Member 
State law, but the systems were largely independent. The result 
was that very different rules and procedures might potentially 
apply to transactions or other conduct in Europe. There were 
many potential voices and many jurisdictional considerations. 
In the 1990s, as European integration moved into a new 
phase of expansion and increased economic integration, many 
called for greater predictability regarding permissible conduct 
within Europe. They argued that there should be only one voice 
of competition law in Europe and thus that all institutions 
should apply the same law, namely, European Union law. For 
some decision-makers, this was particularly important in light of 
the major expansion of membership in the European Union 
that would take place at the same time that modernization was 
expected to go into effect. Their concern was that new Member 
States have little experience with competition law or with 
competitive markets in many cases, and thus without a single 
voice—i.e., without certainty regarding contents—these Member 
States may have even more radically different forms of 
competition law and creates an even greater level of uncertainty 
within the expanded EU. 
                                                                                                                                  
9. “In order to establish a system which ensures that competition in the common 
market is not distorted, Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty must be applied effectively and 
uniformly in the Community.” Recital 1 of Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 
December 2002, 2003 O.J. L 1/1. 
10. See David J. Gerber, The Evolution of a European Competition Law Network, in 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2002: CONSTRUCTING THE EU NETWORK OF 
COMPETITION 43 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2005). 
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B. The Institutional Reshaping of Uncertainty 
The modernization package did reduce uncertainty and 
increase predictability in an important sense. By requiring that 
EU competition law be applied in almost all cases involving 
competition law in Europe, it greatly reduced divergences 
among the formal rules of competition law. Although each 
Member State can and usually does have its own competition 
law, there are now only minor divergences from from the 
substantive provisions of EU competition law, because EU law 
must also be applied if the potential effects of the conduct 
extend beyond the borders of a single state, and thus states have 
little or no incentive to have a competition law that diverges 
from EU law. This part of the story has often been told.11 
Often overlooked, however, is the impact of these changes 
on uncertainty. Reducing the number of independent voices 
reduces potential variation in the formal substantive rules of 
competition law. This eliminates many of the causes of 
uncertainty that inhered in the previous non-integrated 
competition law regime in Europe. Yet procedures and 
institutional structures within the Member States have not been 
standardized. Each Member State still has its own procedures 
and institutional structures. 
Recognizing the potential for divergences in the 
interpretation and application of laws in this new context, the 
Commission has established and supported a European 
Competition Network (“ECN”), whose role is to coordinate 
decisions among the various institutions and decision makers 
within the European Union.12 This mechanism has served the 
purpose for which it was intended. It provides a mechanism for 
coordination among the competition law systems applying EU 
competition law rules, and the mechanism is regularly used and 
with noteworthy accomplishments. It also may, however, conceal 
some of the remaining discrepancies and uncertainties. The 
                                                                                                                                  
11. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 2, at 187–202. 
12. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK AT TEN: ORIGINS, 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ASPIRATIONS (Paul Lugard ed., 2011). For a recent discussion, 
see, for example, Firat Cengiz, The European Competition Network: Structure, Management, 
and Initial Experiences of Policy Enforcement (European University Institute Working 
Papers Max Weber Programme 2009/05, 2009), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/
handle/1814/11067. 
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system that has been created is complex, and it is important to 
recognize the sources of uncertainty within it. 
1. Formalist Bias 
One factor that tends to conceal the uncertainties in the 
institutional system is what we can call a formalist bias in 
thinking about EU competition law. The process of institutional 
modernization has often diverted attention from the complex of 
factors that influence actual decision-making. Since the 
beginning of the modernization process, the focus of discussion 
has been formal factors and relationships, and the political 
rhetoric that has justified modernization has often further 
emphasized these formal issues. Formal factors include the 
language of statutes, the formal content of reports filed by the 
Member States and the procedures for submitting them, and so 
on. This was given further weight at various points in the 
process. For example, during the process of approving 
membership for the ten Member States that joined in 2004, the 
main issues relating to competition law were formal. EU officials 
who were charged with reviewing an applicant state’s 
competition law had to rely on formal criteria for evaluating the 
state’s readiness for admission to the European Union. They 
focused on issues such as the language of the statute, the 
number of cases opened by the authority, its budget, and so on. 
All these things are important, and it is natural and appropriate 
to focus on them. One consequence of this focus has been, 
however, to draw attention away from other factors that may 
create divergences within the system and from analysis of how 
the system works in practice. 
2. Who Decides 
 Public Enforcement and the Network–Institutional 
modernization reduced uncertainty for businesses operating in 
Europe by establishing that one set of substantive competition 
law principles would generally be applicable to business conduct 
wherever it occurred within EU territory. It also created a formal 
procedure for allocating cases that might be handled by more 
1430 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1421 
than one national jurisdiction.13 In this procedure, there are 
formal principles for deciding which competition authority may 
handle a case. In most cases, this allocates cases among Member 
States based on the contacts between the conduct and the State. 
Some types of cases are the prerogative of the Commission, and 
the Commission may also decide that it wishes to handle a 
particular case that would otherwise be handled by a Member 
State. The ECN is the main forum for the application of these 
rules and for the negotiations that surround them. Prior to 
modernization, each agency applied its own substantive rules 
according to its own jurisdictional principles.14 The institutional 
changes thus represent a significant increase in predictability. 
Issues of who can apply which rules has become a less frequent 
and generally less complicated concern of business decision-
makers. 
The issue of “who decides” remains important, however, 
because of the interplay of three factors. First, modernization 
has made the issue of who decides a matter of regulation and 
negotiation, and both regulation and negotiation involve 
uncertainties relating to negotiating power, access to 
information, and numerous other factors. Second, these 
procedures serve to reduce conflict and uncertainty after the 
conduct has occurred, but the business decision-maker must 
make decisions at a point in time where the outcome of the 
negotiations is unknowable. And third, there remain very 
significant divergences among competition authorities 
regarding the procedures to be applied and the institutional 
contexts and capacities of their application (see below). Taken 
together, these factors may create potentially significant 
uncertainty for business decision makers. 
Private enforcement and the limits of the Network—When 
the potential for private enforcement of competition laws is 
added to this mix, uncertainties increase further. National 
courts in Europe are not part of the ECN, and they are far less 
                                                                                                                                  
13. For analysis, see David J. Gerber & Paolo Cassinis, The “Modernisation” of 
European Community Competition Law: Achieving Consistency in Enforcement—Part I, 27 
EUR. COMP. L. REV. 10 (2006); David J. Gerber & Paolo Cassinis, The “Modernisation” of 
European Community Competition Law: Achieving Consistency in Enforcement—Part II, 27 
EUR. COMP. L. REV. 51, 51 (2006). 
14. See Gerber, supra note 10. 
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susceptible to Commission control and influence than are 
national competition authorities. Here, there is no formal 
mechanism in place to coordinate jurisdictional claims. Private 
litigants can choose courts as they wish based on factors such as 
procedural advantages and disadvantages of one court 
procedure over another, varying interpretations of European 
law among the courts, etc. This means that institutional 
divergences may play an important role in their choices and 
thus that there is less uniformity in the application of the formal 
rules than might appear from the formal structures themselves. 
Private litigation in Europe is still relatively new and relatively 
infrequent, but in some countries the number of private 
competition lawsuits has increased significantly in recent years. 
The European Commission has fostered this expansion of 
private litigation, but the success of these efforts may often 
counteract or undermine the predictability and uniformity goals 
that the Commission has pursued in its procedural and 
substantive modernization efforts.15 
3. Institutional Divergences 
The issue of “who decides” increases in importance to the 
extent that the procedural and institutional factors that 
influence decision-making diverge. If all procedures and 
institutional factors were standardized, the uncertainty would be 
of little concern, but the greater the divergences, the more 
salient are the uncertainties associated with applying the 
competition law. Although some in the Commission realized 
even at the beginning of the process that procedural disparities 
could undermine the effects of modernization, political 
opposition at the Member State level prevented procedural 
standardization from being part of the package.16 
                                                                                                                                  
15. For a valuable set of articles on these and related enforcement issues, see THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN EUROPE (Thomas M. J. Möllers & Andreas 
Heinemann eds., 2008). 
16. See generally Mario Monti, Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, in 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2001: EFFECTIVE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF EC 
ANTITRUST LAW 3 (Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2003). See also 
Hannah L. Buxbaum, German Legal Culture and the Globalization of Competition Law: A 
Historical Perspective on the Expansion of Private Enforcement, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 101, 
101 (2005); Damien M.B. Gerard, Regulation 1/2003 (and Beyond): Balancing Effective 
Enforcement and Due Process in Cross-Border Antitrust Investigations, in INTERNATIONAL 
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As a result, there are major institutional and procedural 
divergences among the institutions applying competition law in 
Europe. Institutional divergences involved issues such as, for 
example, the amount of resources devoted to competition law, 
the political support for competition law, the independence of 
the institutions from external interference, hiring practices, and 
the economic, linguistic capacities of decision-makers. Each of 
these factors can play a significant role in how competition law is 
understood and in particular how specific cases are handled. 
Similarly, each institution has its own procedures. These 
determine factors such as, for example, the extent of data 
available for analysis, the control of the data and of its 
presentation to relevant decision-makers, the roles assigned to 
economists and the procedural context within which they can 
present their work, how decision making is organized, who is 
allowed to be heard and under what circumstances and so on.17 
These factors play important roles in influencing the actual 
outcomes of the application of competition law in the numerous 
institutions that apply that law. 
4. Institutional Relationships 
Relationships among European institutions are important 
not only from the standpoint of who decides, but from the 
standpoint of what institutions may exert influence over 
decisions and what mechanisms are available to them for 
exerting influence. Prior to modernization, Europe’s 
competition law institutions generally had minimal contact with 
each other, and there were few incentives to seek collaboration 
or to follow advice or practices of other institutions. That all 
changed in the wake of modernization. The creation of the ECN 
greatly increased the intensity and importance of relationships 
both between the Commission and national competition 
authorities and among the national competition authorities 
themselves. These relationships became part of the negotiating 
process for decisions within the ECN. This has created strong 
                                                                                                                                  
ANTITRUST LITIGATION: CONFLICT OF LAWS AND COORDINATION 437(Jurgen Basedow et 
al. eds., 2012). 
17. For an example, see Andrea M. Klees, Breaking the Habits: The German 
Competition Law after the 7th Amendment to the Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB), 7 
GERMAN L.J. 399 (2006). 
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incentives for Member State authorities and individual decision 
makers within those authorities to seek connections and 
influence with others in the network. As a result, institutional 
relationships are now a major factor influencing decisions, and 
these types of influences are seldom open for public scrutiny 
and thus can create an additional level of complexity and 
uncertainty. 
This brief review of some of the elements and impacts of 
institutional modernization reveals that it has reduced a key set 
of factors creating uncertainty about the norms of competition 
in Europe. In the process, however, it has introduced new forms 
of uncertainty and reshaped the overall contours of uncertainty. 
In order to make predictions about competition law’s content, 
therefore, it becomes necessary to look in the right places—to 
seek predictability where it exists, and this will often be in places 
other than those generally assumed to be relevant. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE MODERNIZATION: THE LIGHT AND 
SHADOWS OF ECONOMICS 
The substantive component of modernization has also been 
seen as a means of reducing uncertainty, and it has reduced one 
form of uncertainty. It has provided a central conceptual base 
for thinking about competition law in Europe and thereby 
reduced the uncertainties resulting from an unstructured variety 
of ways of approaching competition law. This has been of much 
value, but it has not eliminated uncertainty in this area. It has 
relocated it and altered its contours. As with its institutional 
counterpart, the “more economic approach” (MEA) has played 
a central role in thought and discussions of competition law 
since the mid-1990s. It has been at the core of most discussions 
of what competition law in Europe is and what its objectives are 
and should be.18 As we shall see, these two forms of 
modernization have major implications not only for competition 
law, but for the future of European integration. 
Although the two forms of modernization are interrelated 
and have had similar impacts, they represent two very distinct 
forms of legal change. Institutional modernization occurred 
                                                                                                                                  
18. See, e.g., Anne C. Witt, From Airtours to Ryanair: Is the More Economic Approach to 
EU Merger Law Really About More Economics?, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 217 (2012). 
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through a formal process of changing the procedural 
regulations of the EU. The proposed changes were clearly 
articulated, and representatives of the Member States were 
informed of the Commission’s plans and had to give their 
formal assent in order for the reforms to be instituted. In 
contrast, substantive modernization has evolved as a change in 
thinking about competition policy within the European 
Commission, and this change in thinking has spread from the 
Commission to other institutions in varying ways and with 
various levels of penetration. Most involved with competition law 
in the European Union recognize the basic idea behind the 
change, but many remain uncertain about its details. This has 
led to major issues involving the degree to which other EU and 
Member State institutions accept the Commission’s views in this 
area. 
A. Content and Contours of Substantive Modernization—The More 
Economic Approach 
The central idea behind substantive modernization and the 
MEA is that economics should play a greater role in the 
development and application of European competition law. 
What that greater role should be remains a subject of 
controversy. “How much more?” “More than what?” Views differ 
on these questions. Moreover, the term “MEA” and the idea 
behind it have tended to polarize opinion. For some, it has 
become a shibboleth; for others, it functions as a semi-sacred 
talisman.19 The debate has become freighted with emotional 
baggage, which has further exacerbated the uncertainty. We 
need, therefore, to briefly review the basics of that evolution. 
                                                                                                                                  
19. For discussion and comparison, see, for example, Ioannis Lianos, Categorical 
Thinking in Competition Law and the “Effects-Based” Approach in Article 82 EC, in ARTICLE 
82 EC: REFLECTIONS ON ITS RECENT EVOLUTION 19, 19 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2009); 
Christian Ahlborn & Jorge Padilla, From Fairness to Welfare: Implications for the Assessment 
of Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition Law, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 
ANNUAL 2007: A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC 55, 55 (Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds., 2008). For a valuable collection of articles on the issue, 
see ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMPETITION LAW (Josef Drexel et al. eds, 2009). 
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1. The Commission’s Role 
During the 1990s EU competition officials began to call for 
changes in European competition law that would introduce 
greater use of economics into European competition law. These 
efforts were related to major changes in US antitrust law that 
began in the 1970s and radically changed its substantive 
content.20 That development moved economics to a central 
normative role in US antitrust law. The basic criterion of the law 
was whether conduct could be clearly identified as having 
specific economic effects. Economists and legal scholars in the 
United States created a powerful literature that demonstrated 
how form-based rules—i.e., rules based on the characteristics of 
the conduct itself—could lead to competition law decisions that 
harmed rather than protected competition. The basic insight 
was that the effects on competition of conduct by a firm with 
market power differ from the effects produced by the same 
conduct engaged by a firm without market power. Competition 
law rules based on the form of the conduct itself could therefore 
lead to market interventions that discouraged competitive 
conduct—the opposite of protecting competition. The claim was 
that competition law should intervene in the economic process 
only where specific conduct under specific circumstances could 
be clearly shown through the tools of economic science to harm 
the competitive process. From this perspective, conduct that had 
been considered a violation of European competition law on the 
basis of previously existing form-based rules appeared 
inappropriate and potentially harmful to the European 
economy. 
Commission officials began to take these arguments 
seriously as institutional modernization was moving forward and 
in the context of impending major expansion of the European 
Union.21 They revised regulations to include a greater normative 
role for economics and more scrutiny of the effects of conduct 
and less concern with their form. Initially the new approach 
focused on vertical restraints, but the changes soon also altered 
                                                                                                                                  
20. For comparative discussion, see David J. Gerber, Comparative Antitrust Law, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1193 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2006); David J. Gerber, Competition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 510 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003). 
21. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 2, at 187–204. 
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assessment of mergers and of horizontal agreements. Although 
Commission leaders have also introduced more economics-
based analysis into the assessment of dominance, the impact of 
the changes has been less clear in this area of competition law.  
From the outset of this process, one of the main 
justifications for these changes has been the potential of an 
MEA to unify, standardize, and give greater predictability to 
competition law.22 An economics-based competition law was cast 
as a single, conceptual and normative framework for 
competition law throughout the European Union. This also 
symbolized a higher level of European integration and at the 
same time sought to assure that the new Member States did not 
develop their own conceptions of competition law. There was 
concern among Commission officials and others that if many 
new competition authorities were now included in the European 
Union, this could increase uncertainty and lead to major 
divergences between and among competition laws of the 
Member States. The normative use of economics was seen as a 
means of avoiding or at least significantly reducing this potential 
for diversity and uncertainty. Economics, it was claimed, was a 
clear conceptual framework for competition law. If, therefore, 
every Member State followed the economic approach, there 
would be little basis for divergence and its resulting 
uncertainties. 
2. Reception by Other Institutions 
The Commission initiated this form of modernization, and 
it has remained the driving force behind the drive for more 
economics. This central role is a key to understanding the 
dynamics of competition law in Europe today, because other 
institutions responsible for interpreting and applying EU 
competition law have moved at varying paces in seeking to 
understand the Commission’s views on the role of economics 
and to absorb this set of ideas in their own decisional practices. 
Many competition law decision-makers and scholars are unsure 
of how to use economics and how much to use economics. 
                                                                                                                                  
22. See, e.g., Götz Drauz, A View from Inside the Merger Task Force: Comments on 
“Reforming European Merger Review: Targeting Problem Areas in Policy Outcomes”, 2 J. 
INDUS., COMPETITION & TRADE 391, 391–99 (2002). 
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Others have not been convinced that this approach is 
appropriate for the European Union, at least in its present form. 
This has led to lively debate for more than a decade about what 
the more economic approach is and what its consequences are 
likely to be.23 
All European institutions appear to have accepted the basic 
idea that effects should be considered in applying EU 
competition law, at least most of the time, but their acceptance 
of a normative role for economics is far from even. The two EU 
courts have used some of the concepts of the MEA at times, but 
not always consistently or clearly.24 The decisions and positions 
of Member State competition authorities (“NCAs”) also vary 
widely. Some accept and apply the more economic approach 
principles on more or less the same basis as does the 
Commission, while the decisions of other NCAs are far less 
consistent with this view. National courts often remain resistant 
to extensive use of economics in evaluating competition law 
cases. 
B. The More Economic Approach and the Transformation and 
Relocation of Uncertainty 
The Commission has achieved many of the goals that it had 
associated with increased use of economics in European 
competition law. Use of economics as a point of reference has in 
itself reduced the uncertainties that arise whenever numerous 
institutions with differing goals, agendas, and backgrounds 
apply law in a particular area. It has also created an important 
conceptual anchor for competition law that has generated 
stability in the context of EU expansion. To this extent, 
therefore, the MEA has successfully reduced uncertainty. 
It has, however, also transformed uncertainty and relocated 
it, and this aspect of the use of economics is often overlooked. 
Failure to recognize this aspect of substantive modernization can 
                                                                                                                                  
23. See, e.g., Röller, supra note 8, at 13. See also the collections of articles in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW (Einer R. Elhauge ed., 
2012) and in COMPETITION POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC APPROACH (Josef Drexl et al. 
eds., 2011). 
24. For an example, see Kelyn Bacon, European Court of Justice Upholds Judgment of 
the European Court of First Instance in the British Airways/Virgin Saga, 3 COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L 227, 227 (2007). 
1438 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1421 
lead to misconceptions and misunderstandings that can have 
significant impacts on competition law in the European Union. 
We look briefly, therefore, at this aspect of modernization, the 
obstacles to understanding it, and the potential consequences of 
failure to grasp it more effectively. 
1. Language, Methods, and Outcomes: Unraveling the 
Relationships 
A valuable starting point for analyzing this transformation is 
a focus on the uncertainties within economics itself. As a 
science, economics offers a language and a set of methods that 
can be used in evaluating and predicting economic phenomena. 
On its face, therefore, “more economics” means no more than 
increased use of this language and methodology. This basic 
observation brings into higher relief a central source of 
misunderstanding about the MEA and about the discrepancies 
between promises and expectations relating to it, on the one 
hand, and the outcomes it has produced, on the other. 
Use of economic language and methodology can provide a 
framework for thinking about competition law.25 To the extent 
that economics is used for particular functions, it structures 
discussion and limits the range of perspectives that can be 
brought to bear on the performance of that function. The 
standardizing impact of economics operates, therefore, at the 
conceptual and linguistic level. This means that its potential 
value for standardizing outcomes depends on the objectives for 
which it is being used, the persons and institutions that use it, 
and the conditions of its use. “More economics” may not 
necessarily, therefore, limit the range of potential outcomes in 
competition law. It has the potential to play that role, but 
whether it does so depends on how and by whom it is used.  
                                                                                                                                  
25. For discussion and examples, see Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of 
Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 471 (2012); 
Ioannis Lianos, ‘Judging’ Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation—A 
European view, in THE REFORM OF EC COMPETITION LAW: NEW CHALLENGES 185 
(Ioannis Lianos & Ioannis Kokkoris eds., 2010); see also MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION 
POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 17–31 (2004). 
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2. The Diverse Roles of Economics 
A key to analyzing the transformation of uncertainty 
through the MEA is to perceive, identify, and untangle the 
differing roles that economics can play in competition law.26 I 
here identify three main functions that economics performs in 
competition law systems and examine some of the factors that 
are likely to influence their potential for supporting 
standardization. 
One is the role of economics in describing—i.e., assembling 
and interpreting data and identifying and quantifying 
relationships among economic variables. Economists are trained 
to structure data for purposes of more precise analysis and to 
identify the actual and potential effects of conduct on other 
economic variables. Their training prepares them to perform 
these tasks effectively and thoroughly. Their role is thus 
primarily descriptive. This function is valuable for competition 
law decision-makers, and thus they have incentives to employ 
economists to provide this kind of information. 
This descriptive function does not necessarily limit the 
range of outcomes from the application of competition law and 
lead toward standardization of the substantive norms of 
competition law. The use of economics to describe facts can 
serve any competition law or regulatory goals. It merely 
increases the amount and quality of information available for 
use by the decision-makers. It does not itself dictate the 
purposes for which the information is used. Moreover, many 
other factors influence how the tools of economics are 
employed. The use of economics to gather and interpret factual 
data is costly. How much description can be performed by 
economists depends on the resources available to the 
competition law system using them. In addition, these costs are 
born by different actors in the system, and these actors have 
varying incentives. This means that there will virtually always be 
major differences in the amount and quality of description 
among competition law systems. 
                                                                                                                                  
26. For analysis of the embeddedness of economics in procedural and 
institutional frameworks, see David J. Gerber, Competition Law and the Institutional 
Embeddedness of Economics, in ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMPETITION LAW, supra note 19, 
at 20. 
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A second role for economics is normative. Here economics 
provides the basic norms of competition law. For our purposes, 
identifying this as a separate function is critically important, 
because failure to distinguish it from other functions of 
economics can render analysis confusing, at best, and 
misleading, at worst. I use the term “normative role” to refer to 
the role of economics as a source of competition law norms. In 
this role, economics determines to a greater or lesser extent the 
substantive content of competition law—“Does conduct violate 
the law or not?” In US antitrust law, economics plays this role to 
a very significant extent. If economics determines, for example, 
that conduct has increased a price above a competitive price, the 
conduct will generally be considered to have violated the law. If 
it does not, this generally precludes a finding of antitrust 
violation. Economics is, of course, filtered through and applied 
by legal institutions, but the basic proposition is that conduct 
violates competition law if and only if it causes or can be 
expected to have specified economic effects. 
A third potential role for economics is seldom identified 
clearly, but there is much analytical value in doing so—
methodological discipline. This use provides support for 
standardization while maintaining avenues for disciplined 
differences among competition law regimes. In this use, 
economic methodology provides a channeling mechanism that 
can reduce the range of variation in the norms of competition 
law systems while at the same time enabling and identifying 
variations within that range. 
Economic methods can narrow the range of decisions 
related to a specific legal function precisely because the use of 
such methods requires that certain kinds of questions be asked 
and particular kinds of analyses be used. Methods impose 
requirements on decision-making, and they impose obligations 
on decision-makers. These requirements and obligations 
constrain the discretion of decision-makers either directly or 
indirectly (by exposing deviations from the methods). 
Identifying these related, but quite distinct, roles for 
economics in competition law helps to clarify the potential for 
differences in competition law outcomes resulting from the 
objectives for which economics is used and the functions for 
which it is employed. 
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3. Diverse Institutional Dynamics 
Each function that economics performs is influenced by the 
institutional dynamics of the institution performing the 
function.27 As noted above, the actual impact of economics on 
competition law decisions depends on who is using it, for what 
purposes, and subject to which conditions and influences. Each 
institution—whether the European Commission, an NCA, or a 
court—has its own agenda, its own configuration of resources 
and capacities, and a specific set of factors that shape the 
preferences of decision makers—e.g., incentives for promotion. 
Individual decision-makers within the institution also have 
varying degrees of knowledge and capacity relating to the use of 
economics in the competition law content, and they have 
differing individual and collective experiences in using it. These 
shape expectations regarding the MEA and, in turn, this shapes 
incentives to use it—or not—in particular ways. 
4. Diverse Procedures 
Procedural mechanisms differ significantly along numerous 
criteria that affect the way economics is used.28 For example, 
there are significant differences in the degree to which data is 
available to decision-makers who wish to apply economic 
methodology. The value of economic methodology often 
depends on how much data is available for the economist to use, 
how much control the economist has over the investigation and 
procurement, and so on. Economists also play varying roles in 
institution. In some, they may be given significant roles in the 
decision-making process and/or significant opportunities to 
influence decision-makers. In other enforcement institutions, 
economists may have limited roles and limited status within the 
                                                                                                                                  
27. For comparative analysis of procedural functions, see David J. Gerber, 
Comparing Procedural Systems: Toward an Analytical Framework, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A 
MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 665 (James A.R. 
Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds, 2002). 
28. For discussion, see, for example, Andrew I. Gavil, The Challenges of Economic 
Proof in a Decentralized and Privatized European Competition Policy System: Lessons from the 
American Experience, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 177 (2008); Oles Andriychuk, 
Rediscovering the Spirit of Competition: On the Normative Value of the Competitive Process, 6 
EUR. COMPETITION J. 575 (2010). 
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institution. In courts, they seldom have direct access to decision-
makers at all. 
5. Relationships among Institutions  
Relationships among institutions may also influence the way 
economics is used. Procedural modernization created a network 
of relationships among Member State as well as between the 
European Commission and Member State competition 
authorities. These relationships may influence the degree to 
which economists have access to data from other jurisdictions, 
the extent to which they can coordinate their efforts with the 
efforts of those controlling and/or interpreting data in other 
jurisdictions, and so on. There are also less formal networks of 
economists within Europe and internationally that have varying 
degrees of status and influence relating to these institutional 
relationships. Moreover, national courts have varying 
relationships to the national competition authorities as well as 
varying views of their obligations to follow Commission decisions 
and guidance regarding the use of economics in competition 
law cases. 
6. External Factors 
The application of economics methodology in competition 
law institutions is also influenced by a variety of factors that are 
external to the institutions themselves, but that nonetheless can 
have a significant impact on decision-making within it.29 The 
structure and characteristics of the economics profession in the 
jurisdiction and its relationship to the competition law 
institutions can, for example,  have important effects on the use 
of economics in those institutions. Economics as a profession is 
international in some senses, but European jurisdictions vary 
significantly in the extent to which economists as a profession 
are organized in ways that support and promote the use of 
economics in competition law institutions. Even the term 
“economist” (and its cognates) is defined in differing ways. 
Sometimes it refers only to holders of PhD degrees, while in 
                                                                                                                                  
29. See, e.g., David J. Gerber, Convergence in the Treatment of Dominant Firm Conduct: 
The United States, the European Union, and the Institutional Embeddedness of Economics, 76 
ANTITRUST L.J. 951 (2010). 
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others it includes those who have the equivalent of masters level 
(or even less) training in economics. Often these differences in 
institutional influences and incentives are overlooked in 
analyzing the role of economics in competition law in Europe. 
C. Identifying Uncertainty Issues 
Substantive modernization succeeded in reducing one form 
of uncertainty—the uncertainty that resulted from having 
divergent conceptual bases for competition law in Europe. By 
providing a defined and unified conceptual reference point for 
competition, it has been of much value. As we have seen, 
however, it did not eliminate other types of uncertainty, and it 
introduced a new set of uncertainties. 
The brief review here of some of these sources of 
uncertainty should not detract from the value of economics as a 
decisional framework, but it does elucidate some of the factors 
that influence its actual operations and create divergences and 
uncertainties within Europe. It reveals the need for a more 
nuanced view of the role of economics and economists in 
European competition law. 
The combined effect of these two forms of modernization 
has been, therefore, to restructure and relocate uncertainty 
about competition law in Europe, and understanding EU 
competition law is today in large part about understanding what 
has changed and where and how these new uncertainty factors 
operate and how they influence decisional outcomes. 
Traditional lenses based on the operation of law in a single 
country often miss and/or distort these factors, and thus the 
new situation calls for modifications of these lenses. 
IV. IMPROVING THE LENSES: DYNAMICS AND DECISIONS IN 
THE EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW SYSTEM 
In this Part, I outline a basic framework that addresses these 
potential distortions and inadequacies in the lenses used to view 
European competition law in the wake of procedural and 
substantive modernization.30 It alters the focus and tools of 
                                                                                                                                  
30. This analysis is outlined in David J. Gerber, System Dynamics: Toward a 
Language of Comparative Law?, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 719 (1998). 
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analysis in ways that correspond to the changes brought about 
by these two forms of modernization. This necessarily entails 
altering some of the questions asked and organizing knowledge 
in ways that respond to these questions. 
A. Embedded Decisions as the Basis for Analysis 
The starting point for enhancing the effectiveness of 
analysis is fundamental to the rest of the analysis. If the analysis 
starts from more traditional ways of viewing the material, such as 
focusing on what potentially relevant texts say, the results are 
likely to be suboptimal. As we have seen, in a context in which 
decisions are made by diverse and often quite different 
institutions and players, texts may be viewed, used, and applied 
in varying ways throughout the European system. As a result, the 
starting point may obscure questions that need to be asked in 
order to be in a position to predict decisions about what the law 
is. 
When we change the starting point for the analysis and 
begin with the decisions themselves, the picture changes. This 
move reveals relevant questions that more traditional forms of 
analysis tend to marginalize. Starting with texts suggests that 
there is a single voice—“the law.” Yet, there is no single voice in 
European competition law today. There are numerous 
institutions making claims about what the law is and/or using 
varying reference points in applying the provisions of law. The 
focus of analysis should, therefore, be the decisions that 
represent what law is in potentially relevant contexts. This is 
what those interested in European competition law—whether 
practicing legal professionals, business advisors, or others—need 
to know. Thinking about competition law after modernization 
requires foregrounding the diversity of influences on decisions 
among the institutions applying the law. 
The focus on decisions naturally leads to questions about 
the factors that influence those decisions. These kinds of 
questions tend to be treated unsystematically in traditional 
thinking about law. Often they are little more than anecdotal 
considerations. They may be mentioned, but they are seldom 
studied in ways that reveal patterns that can be useful in 
predicting decisions. The assumption is often that they are 
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secondary issues that are not susceptible to organization and 
effective analysis. 
They can, however, be studied in ways that provide a basis 
for predicting future decisions and thus ascertaining “the law in 
operation.” I have suggested elsewhere one way of generating 
structure into the data that allows it to be systematically 
studied.31 It can reveal information that does assist in knowing 
and advising about what the law is. I refer to this form of analysis 
as “system dynamics.” It gives structure to the data and thereby 
enhances the users’ capacity to perceive relationships among 
decisional factors and thus more effectively predict outcomes. It 
groups decisional influences into four main categories. They are 
related to each other at the point of individual decisions. Some 
examples are below.   
B. Localizing Decisions 
Applying this analysis in the EU competition law context 
emphasizes the need to localize decisions that may be relevant 
to particular forms of conduct in particular situations. Who is 
deciding? Given the variety of institutional voices in the 
modernized competition law system, it is necessary to know 
where to look in thinking about what will happen in a specific 
situation. Outcomes may vary significantly, depending, for 
example, on whether the relevant decision-maker is the 
European Commission or a court in a specific Member State. 
C. Decisional Influences 
This allows us to identify and isolate the influences on those 
decisions. These influences are interrelated in actual decision-
making, but they can be identified separately, and patterns of 
interaction among them can also be identified. 
Authoritative Texts—One set of decisional influences 
consists of the texts that are considered authoritative by the 
institutions involved—e.g., statutes, regulations, and judicial 
opinions. They express the authority that is central to the 
application of law.32 To the extent they are considered 
                                                                                                                                  
31. Id. 
32. “Text” here refers to a set of linguistic meaning units (usually “words”) that is 
basically fixed. In modern systems texts are typically written, but a text may also refer be 
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authoritative by a set of decision-makers they constrain decision-
making within that group and relate the decisions of each to 
those of the others. Each institution within the European Union 
has its own configuration of authoritative texts, and recognizing 
their distinctive roles yields insights into the decision-making 
process. One consists of texts that are authoritative for all 
Member States’ institutions—i.e., texts produced by the 
European Union itself. These foster standardization among the 
Member States, but each Member State also relies on another 
set of texts which is considered authoritative only for its own 
institutions, and they often diverge extensively from each other. 
EU texts provide the basis for claims about what the law is 
in Europe. They represent a framework that is expected to relate 
decisions throughout European institutions to each other, and 
thus it is the strongest tie among the institutions and the most 
influential constraint on the decisions that are likely to be made. 
In the European Union the relevant treaties provide the overall 
framework for reference in competition law, but they are quite 
general and abstract, with the result that more specific texts 
become primary reference points. These include regulations 
and directives that vary significantly in their level of specificity 
and thus of guidance to decision-makers. 
Each Member State has its own set of potentially relevant 
texts, however, and these are not a common reference point for 
all, but a factor of variation. Some of these may relate to fact 
patterns that may be covered by EU texts, but may be 
inconsistent with them. Although the competition law statutes of 
the Member States now align closely with EU level provisions, 
some differences remain.33 There may also be other regulatory 
or constitutional factors that overlap with competition law 
provisions. For example, domestic intellectual property 
provisions sometimes relate to conduct that is also covered by 
                                                                                                                                  
maintained by oral or other forms of tradition. For further discussion, see David J. 
Gerber, Authority Heuristics and Legal Knowledge, in ORDINARY LANGUAGE AND LEGAL 
LANGUAGE (Barbara Pozza ed., 2005), reprinted and revised in David J. Gerber, Authority 
Heuristics and Legal Knowledge, 79 CHI-KENT L. REV. 959 (2004). 
33. For examples related to Art. 102 (abuse of dominance), see EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION LAW: THE IMPACT OF THE COMMISSION’S GUIDANCE ON ARTICLE 102 
(Lorenzo F. Pace ed., 2011). 
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competition law.34 Finally, as noted above, there are institutional 
and procedural regimes in each state that may affect the way the 
texts of EU law are interpreted and applied. 
Institutions—Institutions create their own set of influences 
on legal decisions. They subject decision-makers to pressures 
and incentives. Each is part of a structure of authority, and each 
contains its own internal structure of authority. These varying 
structures influence who is heard by decision-makers and the 
kinds of influence individuals can have on decisions within the 
institution. For example, they create authority relationships 
which determine whose views are to be given weight within the 
institution or can be considered to represent the institution. In 
addition, each institution has its own decision-making 
procedures, hiring and career advancement structures, and its 
own set of relationships with other institutions, both public and 
private.  
As we have seen, institutions that apply competition law in 
the EU context differ significantly in each of these ways. At the 
EU level itself, there are two very different sets of institutions 
that make authoritative decisions about competition law—the 
EU Commission and the EU courts. They differ along many 
axes. For example, the responsibilities of the institutions, the 
training and backgrounds of the decision-makers, their personal 
and shared agendas, and their incentives diverge significantly. 
The two EU courts play authoritative roles in European 
competition law, but they have not always been consistent with 
each other, and to some extent these differences may reflect 
differences in their respective roles and agendas as well as other 
factors such as differences in appointment procedures and 
priorities.35 
The Commission has its own structures, responsibilities, 
influences, and incentives, which are quite different from those 
of the courts. Moreover, its competition decisions are influenced 
                                                                                                                                  
34. See, e.g., Josef Drexl, AstraZeneca and the EU Sector Inquiry: When Do Patent 
Filings Violate Competition Law? (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & 
Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-02, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2009276. 
35. See generally THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: 
ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE-LAW (Allan Rosas et al. eds., 
2013). 
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by the structures and institutions within the Commission. The 
European Commission is the bureaucracy of the European 
Union and has responsibility for all EU policies and objectives. It 
must approve major decisions in the competition law area, and 
it must consider the effects of these major decisions on other 
areas of European law. The Commissioner for competition is 
primarily responsible for competition policy, and s/he must 
consider both the intra-European as well as extra-European 
consequences of decisions. The Directorate-General for 
Competition must interpret existing EU law, develop 
competition policy, interact with other parts of the EU 
bureaucracy, and apply the law. Finally, the Legal Service of the 
European Commission has responsibility for aligning the 
Commission’s decisions with EU law, and in many cases it must 
approve decisions taken by the competition directorate. 
The institutions of the Member States—the courts and the 
competition authorities—differ in similar ways both in relation 
to the EU institutions and in relation to each other. Each 
Member State institution has its own dynamics and is subject to 
its own configuration of influences. They are influenced by the 
political and economic context of the country, its size, its 
history, its educational system, and the like. The ECN has 
opened avenues of greater understanding and coordination 
among these institutions, but divergences in institutional 
dynamics remain highly significant. 
Communities—A third type of influence on legal decision-
making is found in patterns of “community” within legal 
systems. I use the term “community” to refer to regularized 
patterns of relationship—here, among actors that affect 
competition law decisions. Who talks with whom? Who has 
status, etc.? This concept of community includes not only 
officials within the institutions, but also others who talk with 
competition law decision-makers and have status in the eyes of 
those decision-makers. For example, professors of law and of 
economics, as well as academic and private economists, often 
talk on a regular basis with competition officials, and 
competition officials often respect their views. Each of these 
factors can significantly impact decisions. Decisional analysis can 
investigate these patterns of status and communication among 
those who make or influence competition law decisions. 
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Patterns of thought—A fourth category of influence 
includes patterns of thought and discourse within legal 
communities. These may include, for example, established 
orthodoxies about how to analyze competition law issues. For 
example, resistance to substantive modernization is often 
associated with existing patterns of thought that focus on the 
primacy of textual analysis in applying law. Such patterns 
condition how decision-makers identify and evaluate relevant 
data, their perception of particular kinds of evidence, their 
expectations regarding the roles of courts and administrators 
and so on. Patterns of thought can be identified and analyzed by 
examining the language and decisions of relevant actors, both in 
writing and in oral communications. 
D. Decisional Analysis as an Analytical Framework 
This brief look at factors that influence decisions in the 
modernized European competition law is revealing. Each of the 
factors plays a role, and they are all interrelated. This 
emphasizes the potential value of an analysis structured around 
decisions and influences on those decisions. This form of 
analysis structures the data necessary for predicting decisions 
and reducing uncertainty. It reflects the multi-voice character of 
the European competition law system, and it emphasizes the 
need to place decisions in the context of the complex legal 
relationships that constitute the system of competition law in 
Europe. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This analysis of the transformations of uncertainty in 
European competition law since the late 1990s reveals the extent 
of the changes that have occurred and the need for more 
effective ways of analyzing and understanding competition law 
in Europe. The modernizations were intended to reduce certain 
kinds of uncertainties and to increase predictability and 
uniformity of law within the European Union. They have done 
that, but they have also reshaped, transformed, and relocated 
uncertainty, creating new forms of uncertainty in the process of 
eliminating or reducing others. Moreover, the modernizations 
and the search for greater certainty they represent have 
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sometimes also obscured the consequences of these changes, 
making uncertainty less visible and thus more difficult to 
penetrate. 
It is critically important, therefore, to develop ways of 
thinking about European competition law that identify and 
comprehend these uncertainties. As we have seen, the use of 
lenses that are not designed for this post-modernization context 
tend to obscure the causes of uncertainty and its many political 
and other implications. If one views modernized European 
competition law with lenses that were developed for national 
systems or for European competition law as it operated prior to 
the modernizations, the lenses may distort the realities that 
those modernizations have created. The two forms of 
modernization of European competition law were a response to 
changes in the European Union and in the world surrounding 
it. Those changes are likely to continue, and thus recognizing 
the new dimensions of uncertainty and developing analytical 
approaches to deal with it represent an urgent challenge. 
